

Saturday, 8 September

Acting

1. Met with Mr. Bundy in afternoon at the White House and discussed several items:

- a. Next U-2 mission;
- b. Instructions to pilots;
- c. Charyk's memo re Sakhalin;
- d. Senator Holland's activities in Florida;
- e. Action re uprisings in Cuba;
- f. British Guiana;
- g. Cuba in next "C" shot.

(See Memo for the Record, 8 Sept., attached)

2. Upon learning COMOR made Cuba targets available to JRC for possible RF-101 coverage, agreed to have ☐ check with Colonel Steakley to determine when JRC will seek Special Group approval. (From Morning Briefing Memo)

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I notified the White House of the latest information on Thursday night (6 September) and it was put under complete freeze. Following a call from the Secretary of Defense, I called Bundy and got an OK to put the analysts to work on the information and to provide it to the policymakers on a need-to-know basis but not distribute it normally. In answer to a question from General Blake, I said this applied to all types of information except overt.

In further discussion, Ray Cline pointed out that further information indicated that the weapon could not be surface-to-air but that it could not be recognized. He said it may be coast defense (anti-ship).

When I raised the question of what to do about the freeze, Admiral Lowrance suggested one more approach to keep it in TKH system. If this is not done, he thought that we might be overtaken by events.

I said that I would make another approach on the basis of uninhibited access by the analysts, handling entirely in the TKH system on a need-to-know basis for the policymakers.

Cline suggested that the intelligence officers giving briefings be warned of the President's concern.

I requested all USIB members to advise their principals, I also asked that, if NSA comes up with further information, I be alerted.

(Taken from notes prepared by Lehman in entirety; now held by )

5. Telecon with General Quinn re freeze (attached).

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7 Sept - Telecon --General Carter to General Quinn

Gen. C: Well, we lost our shirts over there. The freeze is on just as tight as before and probably a little tighter. The things that we worked on are duplicated and they go to a fair number of your people in other areas.

Gen. Q: You know CINCLANT had the first one of these and the Secretary cautioned me this morning and I immediately rounded up everybody that had any knowledge of this so anyway . . .

Gen. C: SAC?

Gen. Q: They didn't have it.

Gen. C: I have got Lundahl preparing me a list of the distribution of the original stuff -- and I am sure you received that. Who gets it? We had done nothing here from Art's shop except to contact your people.

Gen. Q: Except for CINCLANT -- it was a duplicate negative process which they got involved in -- that is where they got it. One thing I am concerned about and before I leave tonight I am going to caution our CI people about any other point - to keep it out of our documents. Was anything mentioned about that?

Gen. C: I stuck my neck out and McNamara(?) was giving me hell this morning and I called up Bundy and then McNamara(?) just backed right off from that position. Rusk said just don't tell my people anything and McNamara(?) said I don't want my people messed up. Just me and [ ] We are continuing with analysis but we are not committing anything to bulletins or anything. But the COMOR-TALENT(?) stuff -- that is something else again.

Gen. Q: I am telling our editor anything on the big subject to check it with me. We may be accused of changing [ ] a broken law but it is going to break sooner or later. Was it at any time mentioned?

Gen. C: Until we could tell them exactly what it was, we could not do it. If we can come out tomorrow and say that it is definitely a so and so, we can come out with it tomorrow.

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8 September 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I met with Mr. Bundy this afternoon at the White House and accomplished the following:

a. I informed him that we would fly our next U-2 mission over Cuba as soon as the weather was right, probably around Monday. I told him that this was our last approved one and I would be hitting him early next week for further approvals. We discussed the air defense dangers and I mentioned casually the possibility of running two planes concurrently to assist in confusing the air defenses. He felt this would require Special Group consideration and I agreed.

b. I left him the original of Attachment #1 to [ ] He found it entirely adequate and said he would show it to the President on Monday. (This has to do with instructions to pilots overflying Cuba, and other related subjects.)

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c. I showed him [ ] memorandum on responses developed in connection with the recent U-2 episode over Sakhalin. He was interested and said he would get the original from General Taylor's office.

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d. I reported Senator Holland's activities in Florida and told him we were playing it ~~in~~ extremely low key. He agreed and said that there was nothing to be concerned about, that we would always have this type of activity by Senator Holland, and that he was not operating under any Presidential instructions but there was no point in making anything of it.

e. I told Mr. Bundy that I had tried to put in writing the President's concern about internal uprisings in Cuba and had found it most difficult; accordingly I had passed the word orally and was sure that our people understood what was wanted. He agreed that we should not attempt to put anything in writing.

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f. I left with him the original of the memorandum on British Guiana. (I also left the first page of the carbon.) He said he would inform the President.

2. In addition to all the foregoing, I informed him of the recent TACKLE flight, of the drop zones, and of our plans for [redacted] tonight. I also told him that we had cranked Cuba into the next "C" shot and that we were now holding for weather. I also told him of the newly acquired Medium Range Ballistic Missile near Anadyr.

3. In connection with the recent clamp on NPIC output, I told him that as far as the general Intelligence Community was aware, this clamp had been directed by me as Acting DCI and not by any higher authority, that there were only a very limited number of people at the top echelon who knew that higher authority had in fact directed this. He seemed reassured and was happy that it had been handled in this way. We will continue this very closely held "need-to-know" activity until further notice insofar as it deals with an aggressive capability from Cuba.

4. I consider the meeting most successful and plan to do this several times a week. Mr. Knoche, please bear this in mind so that you can keep feeding me similar items of information and action for these meetings.




Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Copy 1 - DDCI

Copy 2 - EA/DCI w/back ground memoranda



Copy of [redacted]